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Visitors, or The Political Ontology of Noise  
  
Ian Biddle 
Newcastle University 
 
  
I am … the visitour and the seker out of the wykednes of the fathers in their 
children. 
 
George Joye (1545)  
  
Who is this third person? He makes noise; he is, most assuredly, a 
prosopopoeia of noise. Noise is a person – that is the lesson of Pentecost: it is 
the third person. 
 
Michel Serres (1980)  
  
The whole theory of information and thus, correlatively, that of noise, makes 
sense only in relation to an observer, who finds himself linked in being to them.  
 
Michel Serres (1977)  
  
  
A rat comes to stay  
  
Michel Serres’s Le Parasite opens with an account of a visit. The country rat 
comes to stay with his cousin the town rat. This is a puzzling paraphrase of La 
Fontaine’s fable after Aesop, ‘Le rat de ville et le rat de champs’. The country rat 
gorges himself on the splendours of his host’s riches who, in turn, gorges 
himself on the riches of his ‘host’ the tax farmer who, in turn is implicated in a 
parasitic relationship with others, and the land. This chain of parasitic 
attachments, always asymmetrical, wandering ever upwards in a structure of 
exploitation, is striking not least because of that third meaning noted by Serres 
and hidden for English speakers in the French term parasite, that meaning best 
captured in English by the term ‘static’ or ‘noise’.1 The repast of the two rats is 
interrupted, as is well-known, by a noise, harbinger of the violence to come: 
1 
  
It was only a noise, but it was also a message, a bit of information 
producing panic: an interruption, a corruption, a rupture of information. 
Was the noise really a message? Wasn’t it, rather, static, a parasite? A 
parasite who has the last word, who produces disorder and who produces 
a different disorder. Let’s go to the country where we eat only soup, but 
quietly without interruption.2 
 
  
This enigmatic opening segment of Serres’s 1980 monograph points to 
something we have become used to thinking about noise – its disturbing, 
upending, topsy-turvy-making quality. For Serres, in the ‘message’, that 
‘information producing panic’, there is an Other, a mite that bites, a worm that 
 
burrows, a life form that wants us for a host. Noise, we might say, lives to be 
heard, it feeds on our need for quiet. 
  
The complexity of thinking noise and the parasite together (as the French term, 
and Serres’s employment of it, would seem to want us to do) is a complexity that 
opens out and puts under pressure the political ontology of sound. As a system 
by which the conceptual territories noise/music/silence are mapped and 
managed, the political ontology of sound is also a political theory of 
relationships: there is no quiet without less quiet, no noisy without less noisy, no 
music without its forbidden others. Class, ideology, race and gender are all 
visitors to this process of naming, of holding apart, and holding in mutually 
exclusive relation the three territories. They all make their way, like a little tiny 
parasitic relation of their own, into the mechanisms by which the public sphere is 
managed, into the discourses by which noise-obsessed neighbours, anxious 
public license granters, social theorists and policy makers seek to discipline and 
silence the social. 
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What Serres opens up to us as well, it seems, is a refusal of the common sense 
notion of noise as always already undesirable. Noise in Serres stands not just 
for the outside or the disturbance that breaks the solemn repast, but also stands 
for precisely that which it is deemed to interfere with: 
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Rigorously speaking, there is never silence. The white noise is always 
there. If health is defined by silence, health does not exist. Health 
remains the couple message-noise. Systems work because they do not 
work. Nonfunctioning remains essential for functioning.3 
 
  
In other words, echoing John Cage, what noise makes clear for Serres, and 
brings into our consciousness, is the very materiality of the signal medium itself. 
As he goes on to say, ‘If the relation succeeds, if it is perfect, optimum, and 
immediate; it disappears as a relation.’ Noise is thus constitutive of messaging, 
of communicating, of signalling down the perfect channel. Even in this ideal 
communicative space, this dreamed of complete comprehension between two 
souls, a third figure is held at bay, the parasite in the signal. One way to think 
about noise, then, is as precisely this third position, the marginalised outsider 
that will not leave.  Understood as a bearing witness to the mediatedness of all 
information, all signals, noise enables us to learn to live with the hubbub of 
communication. And in this bearing witness, noise makes us think differently 
about message, about communication, about silence and about how we might 
learn to listen for it. 
 
  
Noise also brings with it a striking and rich litany of synonyms and proxies: the 
outside, the street, the open, the city, and those special places that Michel de 
Certeau called ‘the right side of the street’, the ‘active side’.4 Here, on this sunny 
side, where humans shout and laugh in full public audibility, where voices ring 
out and cars toot their way through the throngs, noise breathes life, and marks 
the joyous openness of a culture to contagion, touch, glance, communion. This 
is the quotidian, the everyday, the space that, more than any other, privileges 
the vernacular. Here we listen to the tumult quite differently from the tense and 
anxious discipline of ‘structural hearing’ or ‘reduced listening’ in the manner of 
4 
Salzer, Schaeffer et al. Anahid Kassabian has noted how the forms of listening 
in which we all of us indulge most of the time are precisely those modes to 
which we pay little or no attention within the disciplinary study of music. As she 
puts it at the end of her influential piece on what she calls ‘ubiquitous listening’: 
  
As we enter the second century of the disarticulation of performance and 
listening, new relations are developing that demand new models and 
approaches. It is easy to see that the industry is changing. It is perhaps 
harder to hear the changes in music, in listening and in subjectivity that all 
of this portends. Yet musics, technologies, science fiction, social relations 
and subjectivities have been fermenting these changes throughout the 
twentieth century. At least in the metropolis, listening to music is 
ubiquitous, and it forms the network backbone of a new, ubiquitous 
subjectivity.5 
 
  
For many, this celebration of the end of the classical model of the subject is very 
unwelcome. The call of ubiquity is an exacting one, to be sure, and there is good 
reason to fear it: in the demise of political agency as we understand it, in the 
demise of the human as we know it, there is no guarantee that what follows will 
not ultimately be the end of us. But there is also good reason to welcome this 
new order, not least since, as Kassabian intimates, it has actually been with us 
for some time. It is only the critical ideolects of the academy that have failed to 
take account of the new and fearful roar of the quotidian everywhere, this 
resolutely stubbornly overwhelmingly noisy ubiquity. 
 
  
Noisy materialism and the silent study  
  
Raising the question as to how to think the relation among material, materialism 
and noise is what is required here. How, for example, are we to query the ways 
in which we have sought to quarantine noise? We have, certainly, tended to 
detach noise from the social conditions in which it is made, encountered or 
interdicted and thereby installed a certain politics of sonic autonomy. What I 
mean by this is that we have tended to approach noise as an idea from a 
sentimentally materialist orientation in which the noise ‘itself’ forms the object of 
analysis as always already constituted, present, and yet somehow 
simultaneously (and magically) unavailable: noise can be felt, we say, it can be 
pointed to but when we come to the real moment at which we ask ‘but what is 
this thing, noise?” we are always dumbfounded. Sentimental materialism, then, 
imputes to noise a certain enchanted auratic quality, a tendency rife in 
musicology, in a certain fascination for material as bounded and complex. The 
recent fascination for noise in sound studies also belongs to this sentimental 
trajectory. We have, one might say, installed a new kind of autonomy paradigm 
(noise for noise’s sake) in which so-called ‘musical autonomy’ (the belief that 
‘musical materials’ are somehow autonomous from the machinations of the 
social sphere) has been transferred to the sonic domain more broadly. We 
ought, rather, to question the terms on which this alignment of noise with what 
Foucault once termed ‘formidable materiality’ has been instated; under what flag 
does the operation of those ‘materials’ that appear to resist or exceed the 
analytical trajectories through which they are construed go about its business? 
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One way in which the sentimental materialism of noise has been played out is in 
the (often hidden) reliance on the juxtaposition of two opposed sonic zones, 
which we might characterise as privacy-silence and ubiquity-noise.  Either noise 
is understood to enable an emancipation from the stuffy drawing rooms of polite 
bourgeois respectability or it occasions a martyrological discourse in which 
sensitive creatures are brutalised by the cruel neighbour or the heartless mob. 
This juxtaposition does not deal adequately with the political ontology of noise, 
nor does it help us to think about the relation among noise, material and labour. 
Certain kinds of labour present themselves as idealising, as if beholden to a set 
of logics wholly at odds with the outside or the street. The site of writing (the site 
of making, of creating, of producing) is one such site that must, at all costs, be 
kept isolated from the hubbub. From Woolf’s room of one’s own, to Kafka’s 
sharp-edged desk that harms and hurts, writing has occasioned much anxiety 
about noise. Kafka, for example, made several references to Gustav Mahler’s 
composing regimen and the famous composing huts in his correspondence, and 
was particularly engaged by the question of how to think the relation of noise 
and creative labour. He was clearly fascinated by the relationship between his 
own writing regimen and what he could garner from written accounts in 
newspapers and other published sources about Mahler’s work regimen. In one 
such reference, complaining in July 1922 to Felix Weltsch about constant 
interruptions by the noise from a circular saw being used nearby, Kafka recalls a 
description he had read somewhere of Mahler’s work regimen: 
6 
  
[…] I think about Mahler, whose summer routine [‘Sommerleben’] was 
described somewhere as getting up at 5.30, he was very healthy then 
and slept very well, bathing in the open, running into the wood where he 
had his ‘composing-hut’ (breakfast would have already been prepared) 
and working there until 1, and the trees which make so much noise under 
the saw, stood around him in a crowd and blocked out the noise. (In the 
afternoon he then slept and only from 4 did he spend time with his family 
and only seldom was his wife lucky enough that he betrayed [‘verriet’] any 
details of his morning’s work.) But I wanted to tell you about the saw [‘von 
der Säge erzählen’]. I alone cannot escape it, my sister must come and, 
at unbelievable inconvenience to her, tidy the other room for me (which is 
also no composing hut, but I don’t want to talk about that), and then I am 
free of the saw for a while. In this way, one has to move yourself [sic] into 
a quiet room.6 
 
  
The German word for a saw, Säge, resonates here with the German word for a 
tale or saga, Sage. The saw is a transplantation (deterritorialisation) of the 
orality (from ‘sagen’, ‘to say’) of the Sage into the noise of the machine used in 
the production of paper, a reduction of the Erzählen of a Sage to the emptied 
out noises of material production. In the second reference, in a letter to Brod a 
few days later in the same month (July 1922), Kafka repeats his reference to 
Mahler’s composing hut: 
 
  
You ask me about the wood, the wood is beautiful, one can find peace 
there, but no “composing hut”. A path through the (still very diverse) wood 
in the evening, when the noise of the birds is somewhat muted (in 
Mahler’s place, the birds would perhaps have disturbed me) […]7 
 
  
The fascination with noise here enacts a deterritorialisation of the creative 
labour of writing (invariably idealised as a kind of holy exception): the writer is 
dissolved into a soundscape, acted upon by external forces in distinct contrast 
to (hegemonic, Cartesian, even ‘romantic’) notions of ideal creative labour which 
work as a proxy for the great universalising narrative of (male bourgeois) cultural 
production. Creative subjectivity is here reduced, shorthanded and curtailed by 
dint of its being worked upon by the hubbub of production: the hidden labour in 
creativity is made audible by noise, like an unwelcome visitor, its ordinariness as 
labour is laid bare. 
 
  
Kafka’s sensitivity to noise, famously shared by Mahler himself,8 is as much a 
sensitivity to ubiquity (the vernacular, the ordinary, the everyday) as it is to an 
anxiety about the porosity of the bubble of privacy that encases the site of 
writing. Here, the doors are closed to the street, the windows firmly and tightly 
locked and the subject withdraws, just as Descartes did into the cold dark oven, 
in order to perform the autonomy so cruelly denied him. The political ontology of 
noise is thus constituted around the acts of opening out and withdrawing, of 
listening for the everyday or isolating oneself from it. This territory, this space, 
we call property. 
7 
  
It has become almost impossible to think about what it means to be ‘modern’, 
what it means, that is, to live in a world without common ties or laws save those 
laid down in the abstractions of law makers, without thinking about autonomy, 
privacy, safety and property. And these terms have become so commonplace as 
to interfere significantly in other ways of thinking about social relations. Crime 
figures have been consistently falling across the Western hemisphere since the 
end of the Second World War, for example, and yet we are all more anxious 
than ever about personal safety, privacy, autonomy. The irrational fear of noise, 
not the fear of noise meant to harm or noise inflicted with malice, but of noise ‘in 
and of itself’, the fear, that is of noise as if it were material, is symptomatic of a 
discourse that Loïc Wacquant has described as carceral, which is to say, a way 
of thinking about the outside, about marginality, poverty, disenfranchisement as 
criminal. The poor have become punishable by what Wacquant in particular has 
termed the ‘great incarceration of the fin de siècle’: 
8 
  
It is not by happenstance that the stupendous expansion of the carceral 
sector of the American state […] was started just when unemployment 
and casual (under)employment were spreading, public assistance was 
fast shrinking before being ‘reformed’ into a system of forced employment 
(called ‘workfare’), and when the ghetto was imploding as the result of the 
combined pressure of black mobilization, deindustrilisation and the public 
policies of urban abandonment.9 
 
  
The two kinds of withdrawal that we note here, then, are mirror images of each 
other: the bourgeois withdraws to his study as the poor are removed to the 
penitentiary. The carceral state and the silent study are profoundly and 
intimately connected not simply by their structural similarities (the act of cutting 
oneself off and of being cut off), but because they also both partake of a logic 
that construes the outside as a space of contagion. This epidemiological logic is 
 
symptomatic of what Michael Bull has termed the ‘aurally privatised listening 
experience’ (of, for example, iPod users), one of those processes by which the 
alien spaces of the city and the potential for contagion can be mitigated by 
creating a ‘seamless auditory experience’ in which the bubble of property can be 
reinstated and made portable.10 
  
The Madrid Commune  
  
Even here, though, the clamour of the street is never fully silenced. I want to 
make a slight shift in my terminology here, which I hope will make clear the 
bases on which I have tried to argue against a naïve materialism of noise: what 
is never fully silenced is not just the street, the outside, the vernacular, but what 
we might want to call, after Antonio Negri, the common. In an interview with Raf 
Valvola Scelsi, Negri responds to the question ‘Why do you maintain that the 
constitutional state is reactionary?’ with ‘Because it defends private property and 
doesn’t recognise the common … And delegates, that is, invents, a system of 
representation and a system of division of power guaranteeing that this system 
cannot be changed.’11 In other words, it is with the cry of the δῆμο̋ [dēmos], 
those withheld from the legislative structures of the Athenian state, that, as 
Žižek puts it (after Rancière), the political ‘struggle proper’ begins.12 The 
constitution of the dēmos as such occurs precisely as it perceives itself to be 
excluded, as its coheres around a deficit of political power: ‘we – the “nothing”, 
not countered in the order – are the people, we are All against others who stand 
only for their particular privileged interests’.13 
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Negri’s comments above about ‘the common’ were made in the context of 
thinking about what he has called the ‘Madrid Commune’. At that moment when 
the political right in Spain sought to pin the terrorist bombings in Madrid’s 
Attocha railway station of March 11th 2004 (two days before the Spanish 
general election) on the Basque separatists, suddenly, through a highly ‘viral’ 
process, a spontaneous political conglomeration (a coming together in shared 
hostility to the claims made by the outgoing governing Partido Popular) was 
suddenly and very powerfully enacted through the jingle-jangle of modern 
communication technology, especially mobile phones. This apparently 
spontaneous conglomeration (what Paolo Virno terms, somewhat dismissively, 
after Rousseau, a volonté générale)14 of the electorate in this manner 
represents a fascinating case study in the sonic agglutination of citizens to a 
particular kind of what Benedict Anderson terms ‘unisonality’, the sounding as 
one of a large number of citizens in the face of a certain mismatch between 
political ideal and political reality.15 Roberto Esposito has suggested, in his 
theoristion of communitas (the basis on which community can or cannot be 
thought), that the common is in some sense both ‘impossible’ and ‘urgent’, both 
obsolete and absolutely unequivocally of the present.16 What the sudden victory 
of the left in Spain showed for Negri is that the common will assert itself at 
moments of profound and extreme crisis as a general intellect, a sudden and 
devastating alignment. 
10 
  
These were noisy days in Madrid. I remember a friend telling me that she could 
not sleep because of conversations in the street, text messages ending with 
‘¡Pásalo!’, ‘pass it on’, beeping incessantly on a mobile phone she could not 
11 
bring herself to turn off and her own sense of radical communion with the 
processes by which the political right was being publicly exposed. A (more than 
usually) sleepless Madrid, standing suddenly for the predicament of a whole 
nation (‘somos todos Madrilenos’ [we are all Madrilians] declared Juan José 
Ibarretxe Markuartu, head of the Catalan government), and connected via the 
commons of mobile communications technology and the internet to every corner 
of the nation, was calling, literally calling, for the end of José Maria Aznar’s 
government. Initially, millions took to the streets to protest the bombings, 
believing Basque separatists to be the perpetrators. But it very soon became 
clear that the dēmos was being lied to. As the editorial of the national 
newspaper El País put it: 
  
Hasta que llegó José María Aznar lo único que se había oído en Cibeles 
había sido la lluvia contra los paraguas y el helicóptero de la policía 
rompiendo en silencio. Pero cuando llegó el presidente, acompañado del 
Príncipe de Asturias y de las infantas Elena y Cristina, fue recibido con 
una sonora pitada seguida de gritos que le preguntaban : "¿Quién ha 
sido ? ¿Quién ha sido ?". Luego la gente volvió a encerrarse en su 
silencio. Y a muchos, atrapados entre el dolor y la impotencia, no era 
lluvia lo que le corría por las mejillas.17 
 
[Until the arrival of José María Aznar, the only thing one could hear in 
Cibeles Square was the rain hitting umbrellas and police helicopters 
breaking the silence. But when the president arrived, accompanied by the 
Prince of Asturias and the Princesses Elena and Cristina, he was met 
with high-pitched whistling followed by shouts of “Who was it? Who was 
it?”. Then the crowd returned to its silence. And for many, caught 
between pain and impotence, it was not rain that flowed down their 
cheeks.] 
 
  
The streets, the internet, the digital commons of the connected crowds, all 
suddenly cohered around a singular instance, and the results in the general 
election turned out to be quite remarkable: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s 
beleaguered left-of-centre Socialist Workers’ Party, the PSOE (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español), set, by all accounts, for a swingeing defeat, swept to 
power with a massive swing to the left (up 39 seats, a swing of over 30%). 
 
  
In this sudden mobilisation we can observe something quite interesting about 
‘noise’ or ‘unwelcome’ sound: first, in its precociousness, in its fundamental 
resistance to exclusion, it functions as a kind of ‘poke’ of agency, the call to 
listen, to commune, to become one among many; second, like the visitors in the 
farmer’s kitchen, the noise in the signal will not be silenced, but rudely and 
incessantly calls us to a communion without our leave, in a parasitic relation with 
its ‘host’; third, like other forms of insistent ubiquity, noise is only selectively 
audible, only available to our scrutiny precisely at those times at which it 
becomes unbearable, rapacious, incorrigible; fourth, noise comforts as it irritates 
in that silence marks the end of life, abandonment, the horror of what might be 
termed the ‘empty pastoral’, the desert. In this last observation, in particular, we 
note something that is often submerged or sidelined in most discourses about 
noise: the relation of noise to abandonment is antimonal in that noise speaks of 
12 
the social in its rawest state, of visitors, neighbours, lovers and saviours. 
  
Noise and the pastoral  
  
If noise speaks of the social ‘an sich’, as Hegel put it, of a raw, unmediated, 
thetic social, then it speaks thereby also of a social without limits, without 
closure, without ethical ground or arbitration. In the light of this monstrous social, 
what Homer called κακομιλία or ‘bad society’, it comes as no surprise that the 
pastoral, that idealised silent realm of blissful interiority, has become 
sentimentally ubiquitous, embedded in political discourse about the social good, 
in nostalgic attempts to reclaim the exotic, to reconstruct lost others and to 
exceed the political economy of postmodern tourism, in a wide range of 
strategies for retreat, for achieving quietude, autonomy, slowness. In all this, the 
demand of the pastoral is to tarry at the borders of exile such that news of the 
lost island of Lemnos, the site in the Illiad of the abandonment of the great 
warrior king, can be carried back as a promise. For Susan A. Stewart, the 
literary pastoral is the site of a profound disconnect between those represented 
and the authorial machinery of the poet. In this sense, pastoral constitutes an 
attempt to represent as ideal or beautiful the exile of bodies to deadly silence, a 
mute Arcadian scene in which cries of suffering are permanently stifled. Indeed, 
what Stewart terms the ‘Philoctetes problem’ stands for her as a structurally 
illustrative account of the ideological work of the pastoral: Homer recounts in the 
Illiad (and after him, Sophocles in his play Φιλοκτήτη̋, Philoctetes ,18 thought to 
have been completed in 409 BCE) how the hero Philoctetes is bitten by a water 
viper and the wound festers; his kinsmen cannot stand the sound of his cries or 
the smell of his wound and abandon him to the island of Lemnos, only to ‘recall’ 
him again when they need him in battle: 
13 
  
How can the poet know – how can anyone know – what sounds, what 
cries, were uttered, what agonies were expressed by Philoctetes in his 
abandonment? It is only because of a consequent reception, one that 
followed the “recalling” of Philoctetes by his men after his command had 
been replaced by others, that such suffering can be given voice. 
Philoctetes may call forever to the wind; it is only this recalling that can 
bring back the repetition of his utterance – the repetition that enables the 
poet to create the image of his suffering.19 
 
  
This cruel abandonment is about silencing the suffering of the wounded hero, 
enclosing him in the pastoral space that robs him of his agentive noise. 
Stewart’s account of the pastoral scene of abandonment is interesting for two 
reasons: first, the scene is silent, or, rather, the scene is enclosed (on an island, 
for example) such that it does not allow the noise of the social to speak; second, 
the scene is founded on a communal cruelty that binds the kinsmen together – 
like the horde in Freud’s account of patricide as a kind of origin of the (homo-) 
social in Civilisation and its Discontents, the scene of abandonment is precisely 
that point at which the men constitute themselves as community, as collectively 
agentive. The ‘recalling’ of the hero, then, happens on the terms that the 
kinsmen set; they determine the manner and time of the return and, at that point 
of return, the hero is instrumentalised as their warrior king (in the Iliad 
Philoctetes is referred to as ‘the Argive’s … great King’). In this sense, then, the 
 
social emerges both as a disavowal and as an affirmation, as both 
abandonment and recall. But the act of recall can only be enacted at the 
moment the horde constitutes itself as community, and that community requires 
the abandonment of its ‘king’ as Homer determines him. This circularity – that 
abandonment is the precondition of recall – is constitutive of the pastoral. 
  
And yet, as Paul Alpers has suggested, ‘one of the projects of pastoral is to 
represent not only the isolated cry of pain, as lyric does, but also the auditor or 
auditors who make it fully intelligible.’20 In other words, audition is precisely that 
act by which the evidence of the pastoral can be carried back or ‘recalled’ at all. 
But if this is true, if auditors ‘make intelligible’ the cry of suffering, then the 
paradox of the pastoral form is to be found precisely in the fact that the news 
can only be ‘carried back’, as it were, in an act of eaves-dropping on suffering 
without intervening in it. Hence, even if one accept Alpers’s recuperative reading 
of pastoral, one is still left with that primary act of neglect or abandonment from 
which the pastoral flows. 
14 
  
Between the cheery promise of Madrid’s noise-as-communion, and the unethical 
act of eavesdropping on another’s suffering in the eerie scene of the pastoral 
there is a great political and ethical chasm. Madrid and Lemnos are a million 
miles apart, it seems, not least because these two articulations of the political 
ontology of noise point to (what seem like) radically different political 
imaginations of the auditor-acousmêtre complex we might in the past have 
referred to as the subject: on the one hand, we have the brightly contagious 
creature who spills onto the street in righteous anger looking for change, 
representation, inclusion; on the other, we have the nature reserve isolate who 
can be eavesdropped on but who cannot sound in communion, cannot join the 
raw and the roar of the dēmos. And yet, the two are not just mutually reliant on 
each other (noise requires the stillness it seeks to break, so to speak), but they 
are structurally implicated in each other as the other’s ground: the cries of 
‘¿Quién ha sido ?’ in the Madrid commune work precisely only in so far as they 
break the flat-line lo-fi stillness of the rain (silence, of course is never fully silent, 
but is constituted around notions of continuity, flatness, inanimate homogeneity). 
It is in the relation of the one to the other that both come into being. In this 
sense, noise, we might say, is a relation. 
15 
  
The cosy sentimental materialism of noise that attends much recent thinking 
about sound more broadly is symptomatic of a consistent and persistent desire 
to parcel up the political ontology of noise into its legislative constituent parts: 
acceptable/unacceptable, reasonable/unruly, bearable/unbearable. This 
binaristic structure misconstrues the mutual reliance of silence and noise as if 
that reliance represented the political structure in toto. To put this another way, 
what is missing here is some account of the complex, messy, demanding 
ubiquity of affect. In coming to an understanding of the Madrid-Lemnos divide 
we will have to raise questions about the affective domain of the political we 
have not raised before. How, for example, do we constitute ourselves 
acoustically? What are the processes by which we seek out and pleasure in 
unisonality? Will the ontological porosity of property, privacy and silence ever be 
overcome, and to what extent is that purported immunity to sonic contagion 
desirable at all? 
16 
  
The difficulties we face in coming to understand the sonic relation and its 
relation, in turn, with the social relation more broadly are symptomatic, I 
suggest, of a crisis in the imagination of the common. The key to thinking the 
sonic/social relation is obscured precisely because it is interdicted by the forces 
that seek to hold us in thrall to the charm of property.21 Without property, we 
have come to believe, we will be excluded from political representation, destined 
to dwell in the twilight of the amorphous proto-dēmos, without demand, without 
voice, without future. To answer the first question I raised above, then (how, that 
is, do we constitute ourselves sonically?), it is in the process of attaching 
ourselves to an ideal scene of pastoral calm, the private imagined acoustically, 
that we think ourselves to be whole. It is not that we are all dreaming of a rural 
idyll, or seeking to live a life like Edward Carpenter’s glorious peasant isolation, 
but, rather, that we have come to identify with a certain sonic scene in which we 
have full control over the boundary between the inside and the outside. In what 
John Picker has termed the ‘soundproof study’, in a model, that is, of a certain 
imagination of social autonomy, subjects have come to think themselves as 
authors of their own soundscapes. Noise has become, quite simply, the name 
we give to the failure of that authorial control. 
17 
  
Yet there have been, as we have seen, some striking moments at which the 
desire for quiet and the private has been put aside for a desire for the 
communion of political activism. When the dēmos spills out into the streets and 
demands to be heard, and citizens leave their purportedly ‘silent’ bubbles and 
are absorbed into the throng, then glimpses are briefly afforded of some of the 
ways in which the demand for representation is made. In Madrid, that moment 
was constituted around the notion that the ‘we’ of the dēmos had been excluded 
from representation: the ‘they’ of a patrician elite not unlike the nomenklatura of 
the Soviet Union had deliberately sought to foreclose the representational matrix 
around a simple political equation (i.e. ‘Basque separatists are the enemy’ and 
‘we have not endangered Spain by joining the Iraq war’) such that the ‘we’ of the 
dēmos is held in a state of hysterical exclusion. 
18 
  
‘Why won’t they be silent?’, Nicolae Ceauşescu once asked his assistant, as he 
stood, on 21 December 1989, on the balcony of the headquarters of the 
Rumanian Communist Party in the Piaţa Palatului in Bucharest, trying to 
address the crowds that had gathered there in protest at the government’s 
actions in the Timişoara uprising. His failure to silence them, the puzzled and 
frightened expression on his face, the roar of boos, hisses, jeers and jibes, all 
this signalled the breaking of the channel and the forging of a new political 
matrix in which the demand of the dēmos to be heard had become deafening. In 
the light of the structural exclusion of both the Spanish and the Rumanian 
majority, a certain jouissance, or enjoyment attaches to the solemn coming 
together, at Cibeles, at the Piaţa Palatului, or at almost any place you care to 
mention, in the shiver of communion, and participation. That coming together, 
moreover, has a very particular sonic character, as an investment in unisonality, 
the speaking of many as one. 
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So what, then, to reiterate my second question above, are the processes by 
which we seek out and pleasure in this unisonality? Psychoanalysis has its own 
20 
kind of answer to this question: we seek out this unisonality, it says, for 
gratification, for the need of contact, for the will to cohere, share, be a part of a 
movement that nourishes. And it does seem right to me that we seek it out 
because we are hopeless romantics, wilful idealists. The social is always an act 
of faith, a giving of oneself to the dangers of misunderstanding, offence, 
contagion. We seek out unisonality precisely, I suggest, because it seems to 
offer a raw and automatic communion, an alignment without introduction, 
intercourse without seduction, and it places us in the comfortable place of the 
object that takes what is given, not having to steer, but being steered, not having 
to think but being thought. In becoming this object of political discourse, the 
thing in the mix, we still the inner cacophony of the soundproof study and listen 
to the roar of others. We seek out unisonality because it seeks us. It wants us 
for a host. 
  
This becoming-object, this new sonic alignment, engages what Gustav le Bon 
termed a psychologie des foules, a psychology of crowds. The crowd, for le 
Bon, is a site of madness, contagion, idiocy.22 Yet it is precisely these kinds of 
‘idiocy’ or contagion that constitute the critical moment at which the dēmos is 
constituted. The roar of the crowd, the flatline lo-fi hum of communion, the to-
and-fro of shouts, chants, demands – this is the noise that demands; it is a noise 
excluded from the patrician signals of political work; it is the parasite that builds 
in the channel until that channel is saturated and breached. The sentimental 
materialism of noise cannot help us here: this is no simple material as such, no 
special sonic domain all of its own, no island of sounds written out of political 
discourse. Noise is here the sound of new signals being sent, new channels 
being opened, new demands of the political matrix being made. Noise is nothing 
more (and nothing less) than the call for a new relation. 
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As Žižek puts it, ‘Politics proper […] always involves a kind of short-circuit 
between the Universal and the Particular’,23 or, to put it another way, the political 
is that space in which the demand enacts a kind of denaturalisation or 
estrangement of the status quo such that exclusion from that order becomes 
sufficiently audible as to demand that someone, or some group be granted 
entry. Knock knock knock. Let us in. 
22 
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